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NOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - DuE PROCESS - FLUORJDATION OF WATER Sup-
PLIES. - In 1953 the California Court of Appeals held valid an ordinance of the
city of San Diego authorizing the fluoridation of its water supply.' By 1956 similar
ordinances were ruled constitutional by the high courts of Louisiana, ' Oklahoma,3
Ohio,4 Washington,5 Wisconsin 6 and Oregon." Only the courts of North Dakota8
and Indiana9 voiced qualified objections. In the short space of four years the legal-
ity of fluoridation seemed to be well established.' 0
Yet, six years later cases questioning the validity of fluoridation ordinances and
the authority of municipal governments to enact such ordinances as "health meas-
ures" are still finding their way to the courts; most noteworthy of which are two
decided late in 1961, Wilson v. City of Council Bluffs" (Iowa) and Readey v. St.
Louis County Water Co.1 2 (Missouri). These cases even today raise the question
of whether fluoridation can be considered a "settled" matter."
The approach of this note will be to analyze the law of fluoridation in terms
of these two most recent cases in the belief that they exemplify current thinking on
the subject and indicate the direction of future development.' 4
Necessary to an understanding of the legal issues involved is some knowledge
of the fluoridation problem generally. The substance fluorine first came into promi-
nence when scientists began to notice an apparent relation between a condition of
the teeth known as dental fluorsis and a lack of dental cavities. While dental fluorsis
left the teeth in a mottled and sometimes unsightly condition, it appeared that such
teeth were almost immune to tooth decay.' 5
On further investigation it was found that this condition appeared only in
areas where there was a high incidence of natural fluorine, and it has now been
established that the presence of fluorine in water does result in a hardening of tooth
enamel thereby making the -teeth more resistant to decay.'6
Since tooth decay has been a steadily increasing American problem, it was not
1 De Aryan v. Butler, 119 Cal. App. 2d 674, 260 P.2d 98 (1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S.
1012 (1954).
2 Chapman v. City of Shreveport, 225 La. 859, 74 So. 2d 142, appeal dismissed, 348 U.S.
892 (1954).
3 Dowell v. City of Tulsa, 273 P.2d 859 (Okla. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 912 (1955).
4 Kraus v. City of Cleveland, 163 Ohio St. 559, 127 N.E.2d 609 (1955) appeal dismissed,
351 U.S. 935 (1956).
5 Kaul v. City of Chehalis, 45 'Wash. 2d 616, 277 P.2d 352 (1954).
6 Froncek v. City of Milwaukee, 269 Wis. 276, 69 N.W.2d 242 (1955).
7 Baer v. City of Bend, 206 Ore. 221, 292 P.2d 134 (1956).
8 McGurren v. City of Fargo, 66 N.W.2d 207 (N.D. 1954).
9 Teeter v. Municipal City of LaPorte, 236 Ind. 146, 139 N.E.2d 158 (1956).
10 E.g., Birnel v. Town of Fircrest, 53 Wash 2d 830, 335 P.2d 819 (1959). The court
upheld a fluoridation ordinance specifically on the authority of Kaul v. City of Chehalis, 45
Wash. 2d 616, 277 P.2d 352 (1954).
11 110 N.W.2d 569 (Iowa 1961).
12 352 S.W.2d 622 (Mo. 1961), appeal dismissed,-U.S.-, 83 S.Ct. 20 (1962).
13 See Nichols, Freedom of Religion and the Water Supply, 32 So. CAL. L. REv. 158,
176 (1959).
14 See, Legal Aspects of the Fluoridation of Public Drinking Water, 23 Gao. WASH. L.
REv. 343 (1955) for an analysis of the 1953, 1954 fluoridation cases and Fluoridation and
Religion, 2 CATH. LAW. 254 (1956) for a discussion of the 1956 case, Baer v. City of Bend,
206 Ore. 221, 292 P.2d 134 (1956).
15 See Dietz, Fluoridation and Domestic Water Supplies in California, 4 HASTINGS L. J. 1
(1952); and Legal Aspects of the Fluoridation of Public Drinking Water, 23 Gao. WASH. L.
REv. 298 (1955) for summaries of the dental health findings relating to fluoridation.
16 Grissom, Fluoridation in Preventive Dentistry, Its Implications for Public Health Nursing,
9 NURSING OUTLOoK, 84 (1961) ; Miller, The Effects of Continuity of Residence and Drinking
Water Source on Caries Incidence in Dothan, Alabama, 61 J. Am. DENTAL Ass'N 457 (1960);
and Shaw, The Safety of Fluoridation, 28 POST GRADUATE MEDICrNE 641 (1960) contain more
detailed analyses of the medical and dental aspects of fluoridation.
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long before a proposal was made that a fluoride compound be introduced into the
drinking water of those areas where it did not appear naturally. Experimentation
showed that the addition of 1 to 1.5 parts of a fluoride compound to every million
parts of water would result in a material decrease in the number of dental caries
while causing only "mild," often "unnoticeable" mottling.'7
The opponents of fluoridation generally concede that the presence of fluorine
does have a beneficial effect as to hardening teeth and reducing tooth decay.'5 The
principal objection has to do with side effects; namely, that artificial fluoridation
has not been tested to the point where it can be said with any certainty that fluori-
dated water is safe for human consumption over a long period of time. It is pointed
out that fluorine is classified as a poison and in doses of any considerable amount
has much the same effect as arsenic.' 9 The contention is that the amounts of fluo-
rine introduced in water supplies, while appearing to be safe, cannot be fairly
evaluated for some time yet. The reason given is that fluorine is a cumulative poison
which builds up in the system gradually and ill effects may not be noticed for
years.20 It is also indicated that some people are allergic to fluorine while others
have impaired bodily functions allowing it to build up more rapidly than usual.2 1
The argument, therefore, is that the long-term effects of fluoridation are simply
too unknown to warrant its introduction on a large scale.
It is out of this background that the legal battle over fluoridation has developed.
The reasons most commonly urged on the courts for striking down compulsory fluo-
ridation are four. First, the municipality lacks statutory authority to pass a fluorida-
tion ordinance. 22 Second, even if authority can be implied from the terms of a
statute, it is an abuse of police power resulting in deprivation of 14th Amendment
due process and equal protection.23 Third, fluoridating drinking water violates the
17 See Dietz, supra note 15.
18 But they do maintain that it tends to make teeth brittle with the result that when a
cavity develops it is much more difficult to fill properly. See letter from Dr. G. W. Heard to
R. C. Day, March 15, 1954, on file in the Notre Dame Law Library.
19 Prolonged intake of even relatively small amounts of fluorides is said to cause brittleness
in the bones, decrease blood clotting, affect the thyroid gland and rate of growth in children,
induce loss of hair, affect the nervous system and cause anemia. Industrial Medicine and Sur-
gery, A.M.A.J., February 10, 1951. Proponents of fluoridation are convinced that the amounts
injected into the water are so small that none of these symptoms are likely to occur.
20 Pilot projects to test artificial fluoridation were set up in 1945 in Brantford, Ontario,
Grand Rapids, Michigan and Newburgh, New York. In 1946 projects were established in She-
boygan, Wisconsin and Marshall, Texas; in 1947 in Evanston, Illinois and Lewiston, Idaho. The
results to date have disclosed no noticeable toxic side effects resulting from the fluoridation.
However, it is maintained by opponents of fluoridation that it will take at least 30 years before
any toxic effects are likely to appear. SPnA, THE DRAMA OF FLUORIDATION, ARCH ENEMY OF
MANKIND (1953).
21 Fluorine is largely passed out through the kidneys, therefore a person having an impaired
kidney function could build up dangerous amounts of fluorine before a normal person. In-
stances of this have been reported but are probably still inconclusive. See Readey v. St. Louis
County Water Co., 352 S.W.2d 622 (Mo. 1961) for a r~sum6 of the alleged side effects of
fluorides.
22 E.g., Chapman v. City of Shreveport, 225 La. 859, 74 So. 2d 142, appeal dismissed, 348
U.S. 892 (1954); Kaul v. City of Chehalis, 45 Wash. 2d 616, 277 P.2d 352 (1954); De Aryan
v. Butler, 119 Cal. App. 2d 674, 260 P.2d 98 (1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 1012 (1954).
23 See Justice Hill's dissent in Kaul v. City of Chehalis, 45 Wash. 2d 616, 277 P.2d 352(1954), and the District Court's unreported opinion, in Chapmanov. City of Shreveport, quoted
in part by the dissenters in that case. Both emphasized the distinction between "public" health
and "private" health, contending that, since tooth decay is not a contagious disease, its preven-
tion is a private matter not bearing a reasonable relation to public health and not within the
purview of the state's police power.
It is also argued that fluoridation is a violation of the equal protection clause of the 14th
amendment since the measure will serve to benefit only that portion of the population between
the ages of six and twelve. The reply has been that the whole population need not be bene-
fited directly by a measure in order for it to be a permissible exercise of police power. So long
as the interest protected is of a sufficiently serious nature to become a matter of public concern
it is a valid subject of police power. Baer v. City of Bend, 206 Ore. 221, 292 P.2d 134 (1956).
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freedom of religion of certain sects who object to taking any form of medication. 24
Last, it is a violation of state or federal pure food and drug laws or is an unauthor-
ized practice of medicine or pharmacy.2 5
In the first of the 1961 cases, Wilson v. City of Council Bluffs,26 plaintiffs staked
their entire case on the argument of lack of statutory authority and were able to
enjoin enforcement of the city fluoridation ordinance on that ground. On appeal
to the Supreme Court of Iowa, the State District Court was reversed and the injunc-
tion dissolved. The Supreme Court ruled that the right to fluoridate could be im-
plied from the general power of a municipal corporation to pass such laws, "as
shall seem necessary and proper to provide for the safety [and] preserve the health
... of such corporation and the inhabitants thereof .... ,27 The Court held that the
existence of statutes defining the authority of a municipality over its water supply
did not preclude treatment of the water in a fashion not specifically mentioned in
those statutes.
The District Court,- in issuing the injunction had gone on the view that §§
397.128 and 397.2629 of the Iowa Code were intended to limit the general power of
a municipality to prescribe for the health and welfare of its citizens as provided for
in § 366.1.30 Since there was no mention in either of these sections of a right to treat
the water supply it was held that no such right existed.
The Supreme Court refused to accept this reasoning and indicated that the
two statutes in question related only to the power of a city or town to purchase and
maintain waterworks and that the manner in which the water could be purified or
In Readey v. St. Louis County Water Co., 352 S.W.2d 622 (Mo. 1961) the plaintiffs empha-
sized deprivation of freedom of choice. This too was rejected.
24 The basis of this argument is that some religious sects, specifically Christian Scientists,
object to taking any form of medication and to force them to drink fluoridated water is mass
medication, violating their freedom of religion. The counterargument is that we have in the
past limited freedom of religious action when the public need called for it, as in the case of
compulsory vaccination. See Dietz, supra note 15 for the arguments favoring constitutionality
of fluoridation; and Nichols, Freedom of Religion and Water Supply, 32 So. CAL. L. REv. 158
(1959) for contentions that fluoridation is a violation of freedom of religion.
25 The key to this argument is the assumption that fluoride, in the minute doses in which
it is added to drinking water, is the same poison which was intended to be regulated by the
various statutes. The cases have uniformly considered them to be different, though the differ-
ence be one of quantity only. E.g., Dowell v. City of Tulsa, 273 P.2d 859 (Okla. 1954), cert.
denied, 348 U.S. 912 (1955); Kraus v. City of Cleveland, 55 Ohio Op. 36, 121 N.E.2d 311,
aff'd, 163 Ohio St. 559, 57 Ohio Op. 1, 127 N.E.2d 609, appeal dismissed, 351 U.S. 935
(1954).
26 110 N.W.2d 569 (Iowa 1961).
27 IowA CODE§ 366.1 (1958).
28 IowA CODE § 397.1 (1958):
Cities and towns shall have the power to purchase, establish, erect, main-
tain, and operate within or without their corporate limits ...waterworks,
.... with all the necessary reservoirs, mains, filters, streams, trenches, pipes,
drains, poles, wires, burners, machinery, apparatus, and other requisites of
said works or plants, and lease or sell the same.
29 IoWA CODE§ 397.26 (1958):
For the purpose of maintaining and protecting such works or plants from
injury, and protecting the water of such waterworks from pollution, the juris-
diction of such city or town shall extend over the territory occupied by such
works, and all reservoirs, mains, filters, streams . . .and other requisites of
said works or plants used in or necessary for the construction, maintenance,
and operation of the same, and over the stream or source from which the
water is taken for five miles above the point from which it is taken.
30 IOWA CODE § 366.1 (1958):
Municipal corporations shall have power to make and publish, from time
to time, ordinances, not inconsistent with the laws of the state, for carrying
into effect or discharging the powers and duties conferred by this title, and
such as shall seem necessary and proper to provide for the safety, preserve
the health, promote the prosperity, improve the morals, order, comfort, and
convenience of such corporations and the inhabitants thereof ... (Empha-
sis added.)
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otherwise treated was left indefinite; apparently to be justified by the more general
"health and welfare" provision of § 366.1.31
In both approach and outcome this case bears a resemblance to one of the first
fluoridation cases, Chapman v. City of Shreveport32 decided in 1954. There, as
here, the lower court issued the injunction on the basis of a lack of authority by
the city to pass such an ordinance, only to be overruled on appeal. 33
The court in Chapman concluded that fluoridation of water bore a reasonable
relationship to the public health and therefore was permissible under the terms of
the city charter which granted the power, "to promote the general welfare of the
city and the safety, health... and morals of its inhabitants....,34
The plaintiffs in Chapman questioned whether fluoridation really was a valid
health measure, alleging an expected cumulative injury to consumers of the fluori-
dated water, maintaining that the ordinance would be an unwarranted exercise of
police power. These contentions were likewise dismissed. 5
Other cases involving a strong attack on the statutory authority of the munici-
pality to pass a fluoridation ordinance were DeAryan v. Butlers0 and Kaul v. City
of Chehalis.37 DeAryan was the first case to rule on the permissibility of compulsory
fluoridation and involved all the now standard objections. The court found author-
ity of the city to pass such an ordinance in the city charter which granted the right
to legislate for the health and welfare of its citizens. Kaul presented a similar situa-
tion except that there the court interlaced the state constitution and three sections
of a statute concluding finally that fluoridation was justifiable under the power, "to
prevent the introduction and spread of disease .... 38
Of all the fluoridation decisions, this produced the most disagreement as is
evidenced by the existence of three dissenting opinions. 9
Wilson v. City of Council Bluffs4" is unlike the average fluoridation case in
that the efficacy of fluoridation was not questioned. Most of the previous cases
were premised on the assumption, either stated or implied, that fluoridation was not
only without benefit, but was physically harmful. This contention, if proven, would
naturally be an important factor in determining the reasonableness of allowing the
31 Ibid.
32 225 La. 859, 74 So. 2d 142, appeal dismissed, 348 U.S. 892 (1954).
33 The reason given by the respective lower courts for their refusal to infer the power to
fluoridate from the general "health and welfare" police power was that tooth decay is a non-
contagious disease and as such is a matter of "private" health rather than "public" health.
34 Shreveport city charter § 2.01 as quoted in Chapman v. City of Shreveport, 225 La.
859, 74 So. 2d 142, 145 (1954).
35 The court laid great stress on the opportunity afforded by fluoridation to improve the
dental health of the community. It dismissed contentions of mass medication on the grounds
that the compulsion was only indirect and technically no one had to drink fluoridated water;
objecting parties could always obtain their water elsewhere. Also rejected was the contention
that fluoridation was unwarranted because it benefited only a single class: i.e., children.
36 119 Cal. App. 2d 674, 260 P.2d 98 (1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 1012 (1954).
37 45 Wash. 2d 616, 277 P.2d 352 (1954).
38 WAsn. REv. CODE § 35.23.440(27) (1952) was read in connection with WASH. CONST.,
art. XI, § 11:
Any county, city, town or township may make and enforce within its
limits all such local police, sanitary and other regulations as are not in con-
flict with general laws
and (24) (56) of WASH. Rv. CODE § 35.23.440 (1952) which gave to city councils the power:(24) To adopt, enter into and carry out means for securing a supply of
water for such city or its inhabitants....
(56) To provide for the general welfare.
39 For Justice Hill's view see supra note 23. Justice Donworth in his dissent emphasized
the authority of the city to furnish water; to him this meant the power to furnish water and
nothing else but water -no fluorides. Justice Hamley, also dissenting, objected to introducing
fluoride into the water because, to his mind, there was no sufficiently compelling reason to au-
thorize such a use of police power in the absence of a contagious or infectious disease.
40 110 N.W.2d 569 (Iowa 1961).
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process. For instance, the court in Chapman v. City of Shreveport41 emphasized
that one of the reasons it held fluoridation to be a reasonable exercise of police
power was the failure on the part of the plaintiffs to prove that fluoridation would
have any toxic effects. Conversely the two cases which found for the plaintiffs did
so on the ground that at least as a matter of law it could not be said that fluorida-
tion was harmless. In Teeter v. Municipal City of LaPorte2 the Indiana Supreme
Court refused to sustain the defendant's demurrer. In overruling the lower court it
stated:
[U]nder the present state of scientific experience and opinion we do not feel
we are in a position to hold conclusively as a matter of law fluoridation will
not have cumulative toxic effects. 43
In McGurren v. City of Fargo44 the North Dakota Supreme Court held that, taking
the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, it could be reasonably
found that fluoridating violated an implied contract between the city and its in-
habitants whereby the city would furnish pure and wholesome water.
Baer v. City of Bend45 is the only case where the lower court sustained a demur-
rer and was upheld by the Supreme Court. The principal contention there, how-
ever, was that fluoridation constituted a violation of freedom of religion. Harmful-
ness of the fluoride was not at issue.
In Dowell v. City of Tulsa46 the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that there was
neither a violation of freedom of religion, nor an abuse of police power, nor a viola-
tion of the state food and drug act. Again there was no evidence introduced at-
tempting to show deleterious effects of fluoride.
Kraus v. City of Cleveland47 in adopting the comprehensive opinion of the
trial judge" likewise found no violations of either the first or fourteenth amend-
ments or of the state food and drug law. Neither was there an unauthorized prac-
tice of medicine or pharmacy. In this case the trial court had carefully considered
the conflicting scientific claims and held that the state of expert evidence concern-
ing harmful effects of fluoride was such that either side could be reasonably followed.
This view was apparently accepted by the Supreme Court since they made no com-
ment, passing instead to the purely legal considerations.
Much the same was Froncek v. City of Milwaukee4 9 in which the court took
the position that it was not for it to say whether fluoridation was beneficial if it was
reasonable in light of circumstances.
So the general pattern is clear. As to violation of freedom of religion, analogy
is usually made to vaccination or. chlorination50 with much emphasis on Justice
Harlan's opinion in Jacobson v. Massachusetts.51 Exercise of police power -is usual-
ly permitted as being a justifiable attempt to protect the health, here the dental
health, of the citizens, and not a deprivation of rights guaranteed by the 14th
Amendment.
The usual answer to the objections concerning violation of food and drug laws
or the unauthorized practice of medicine and pharmacy is that fluorine in the doses
41 225 La. 859, 74 So. 2d 142 (1954).
42 236 Ind. 146, 139 N.E.2d 158 (1956).
43 Id. at 161.
44 66 N.W.2d 207 (N.D. 1954).
45 206 Ore. 221, 292 P.2d 134 (1956). See Comment, Fluoridation and Religion, 2 CATH-
OLiC LAW. 254 (1956).
46 273 P.2d 859 (Okla. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 912 (1955).
47 163 Ohio St. 559, 127 N.E.2d 609 (1955).
48 Reported at 116 N.E.2d 779 (1953).
49 269 Wis. 276, 69 N.W.2d 242 (1955).
50 Dietz, supra note 15 deals extensively with the development of the law relating to vac-
cination and chlorination.
51 197 U.S. 11 (1905). Jacobson has been argued by both sides since on the one hand it
did uphold compulsory vaccination but on the other made allowances for exceptions to the rule.
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in which it is administered is not the fluorine poison that the statutes aimed at
controlling.52
In light of these cases Wilson v. Council Bluffs' s is novel. In no other fluorida-
tion case is the absence of the usual arguments so noticeable.54 Indeed, in disposing
of Wilson the Iowa Supreme Court did not cite a single authority dealing with the
problem of fluoridation. Its decision is based solely on Iowa cases concerned with
the statutory rights of a municipality.
Quite unlike Wilson is the second 1961 case, Readey v. St. Louis County Water
Co.55 The plaintiffs there pulled out all stops in their attempt to show the invalidity
of the fluoridation statute. Their arguments ranged from lack of statutory authori-
zation, through abuse of police power and deprivation of due process to violation
of freedom of religion and charges of adulteration of nonalcoholic drinks in con-
travention of Missouri law.
The first point, concerning statutory authority to pass a fluoridation ordinance,
was somewhat unusual. Whereas, the usual objection based on lack of authority
is that the statute isn't broad enough to cover treating the water with fluorides, 58 the
Readey plaintiffs based their objection on the lack of authority of the county to
pass an ordinance which affected those living within the incorporated areas of the
county.
It was pointed out that the St. Louis County charter empowered the county
council "To exercise legislative power pertaining to public health, police and traffic,
building, construction, and planning and zoning in the part of the County outside
incorporated cities. . . ."5 It was argued that this precluded the county from pass-
ing a county-wide statute such as the one being contested.
The Missouri Supreme Court refused to accept this reasoning. They pointed
to Missouri Statute § 192.300 which empowers the county courts of class-one coun-
ties "to make and promulgate such rules, regulations or ordinances as will tend to
enhance the public health and prevent the entrance of infectious, contagious, com-
municable or dangerous diseases into such county ... ."58 The court concluded that
in this lay the necessary authorization to pass a county-wide health measure; that
when read in conjunction with the section of the county charter 9 empowering the
county to exercise all powers granted to class-one counties, there was indicated an
intent that the council should be able to pass health measures applicable through-
out the entire county. Thus, though the argument was different, the judicial ap-
proach was the same, an attempt to find an applicable enabling statute if at all
possible.6 0 Section 192.300 was the court's choice.
The court next considered the argument that fluoridating the water consti-
52 See supra note 25.
53 110 N.W.2d 569 (Iowa 1961).
54 It was stipulated before the trial that the beneficial or detrimental effects of fluoride
would not be brought into question. As to constitutional arguments, they were not pleaded
before the trial court so the Supreme Court refused to consider them. The only other conten-
tion made by the plaintiffs was that fluoridation violated IowA CODE § 205.5 (1958) which
limits the sale and dispensing of poison to licensed pharmacists. The court took the position
that § 205.5 was designed to deal with the sale of poisons as such and that fluoride used in the
proposed manner was not such a poison. Hudson, When a Vending Machine is Not a Vend-
ing Machine, 11 DRAKE L. REV. 3 (1961) indicates that the court in so construing § 205.5 bent
over backwards to arrive at a construction consistent with the supposed legislative intent.
55 352 S.W.2d 622 (Mo. 1961).
56 Wilson v. City of Council Bluffs, 110 N.W.2d 569 (Iowa 1961) is typical.
57 ST. Louis, Mo., COUNTY HOME RULE CHARTER art. III, § 22 (20) (1950). (Emphasis
added.)
58 Mo. ANN. STAT. § 192.300 (1959).
59 ST. Louis Mo., COUNTY HOME RULE CHARTER art. I, § 2 (1950).
60 Illustrative of this is the approach of the court in Kaul v. City of Chehalis, 45 Wash. 2d
616, 277 P.2d 352 (1954) which involved correlating the state constitution with three sections
of a statute. See supra note 38.
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tuted an abuse of police power in that it bore no reasonable relationship to the
public health and if anything was detrimental to it. It was stated:
Respondents' evidence tended to show further that fluorine is not an
essential element of the human body and that all chemicals bearing the
fluoride ion are insidious poisons and are cumulative in the human body.
61
On the other hand:
Appellants adduced evidence, including the opinions of apparently well-
qualified experts, tending to establish the proposition that fluoridation of
water as proposed by the ordinance in question would ...be highly bene-
ficial to the residents of St. Louis County in that it would reduce dental
decay in children up to 14 years of age by as much as sixty-five per cent by
means of hardening the enamel on their teeth .... 62
The court concluded that, "there is substantial evidence to support a conclusion
either way"63 and that in such a situation the county council could reasonably find
fluoridation to be a safe and effective health measure. Such a finding on the basis
of the evidence in the record was ruled a permissible exercise of police power.
The contention that fluoridation constituted a deprivation of freedom of reli-
gion was dismissed summarily when it appeared that none of the plaintiffs were
members of any religious sect which objected to the taking of medication. 64 The
suggestion that the court should take judicial notice of the Christian Scientist op-
position to any kind of medication was met with the observation that even the water
then taken from the Missouri River contained .5 parts per million of fluorine and
it should make little difference from a religious standpoint if the county augmented
this by adding another .5 parts per million.65
More consideration was given to the argument that fluoridation was "forced
medication" and as such was a deprivation of liberty without due process in viola-
tion of both the United States Constitution 66 and the Missouri Constitution.'7
In answer to this the court relied on the Jacobson6s case which upheld the
constitutionality of compulsory vaccination.
The possession and enjoyment of all rights are subject to such reasonable
conditions as may be deemed by the governing authority of the country essen-
tial to the safety, health, peace, good order and morals of the community
*** Mhe rights of the individual in respect of his liberty may at times,
under the pressure of great dangers, be subjected to such restraint, to be
enforced by reasonable regulations, as the safety of the general public may
demand. 69
Reliance was also had on West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish,70 which, in upholding
the constitutionality of a state minimum wage law against the objection of depriva-
tion of freedom of contract, said:
Liberty under the Constitution is thus necessarily subject to the restraints
of due process, and regulation which is reasonable in relation to its subject
and is adopted in the interests of the community is due process. 71
Following the lead of these cases the Missouri Court concluded that the prob-
lem of tooth decay was of such importance that the council could, in the public
61 352 S.W.2d at 626.
62 Ibid.
63 Id. at 627.
64 Nichols, supra note 24, at 158, 159, indicates that this failure to show a personal inter-
est in the religious determination has been common to most of the fluoridation cases and the
inference is that this lack of a showing of personal injury, has been a factor in the courts refus-
ing to accept the argument of violation of freedom of religion.
65 The court seems to realize that the soundness of this observation may be questionable
and refused to rule on the religious objection, holding it unnecessary to do so in light of the
absence of any showing of personal injury.
66 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
67 Mo. CONST. art. I, § 10 (1945).
68 Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
69 Id. at 26, 29.
70 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
71 Id. at 391.
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interest add the fluoride as a health measure and any liberty of which the plaintiffs
were deprived would have to be counted a concession to a paramount public in-
terest.'
2
The last argument put forth in Readey was that adding the fluoride amounted
to an adulteration of a nonalcoholic drink in violation of Missouri law.73 This con-
tention was quickly disposed of in the same fashion as it was in Dowell v. City of
Tulsa 4 and Froncek v. Milwaukee,75 simply by noting that the statute was never
intended to apply to the problem of additives in water. It was indicated that the
Missouri statute was probably aimed at regulating soft drinks.
Thus, comparing Raedey to the earlier fluoridation cases, it is clear that funda-
mentally the same arguments are being put forth today as were urged in 1953.76
It is submitted that there are two reasons why these same arguments are still
being propounded even though they have not been accepted by even one juris-
diction.
The first reason is that fluoridation is, by its very nature, a jurisdiction by
jurisdiction struggle. As each new state considers it there is always the possibility
of a changing judicial attitude, one favorable to the plaintiffs. Readey indicates,
however, that judicial attitudes have not so changed and apparently are not likely to.
The second reason appears to be a scientific conviction as to the alleged deleteri-
ous effects of fluoride.7 7 As was pointed out, many of the challenges were based on
the argument of abuse of police power.7 8 This was grounded in the belief that
fluoridation would, over a long period of time, produce harmful side effects,7 9 and
therefore, is not in the interests of the health and welfare of the community.8 0 It is
believed that in this lies the only likelihood of a change in judicial attitude. The
cases clearly indicate that on the basis of the law as it now stands fluoridation is con-
stitutionally unobjectionable. Since no appreciable changes of judicial temper have
been manifested in dealing with the conventional arguments, it would appear that
only if fluoridation could be proven harmful and thereby an abuse of police power,
would the courts change their appraisal of its legality. Until some tangible proof is
adduced tending to prove such harmful effects, the constitutionality of fluoridation
will likely stand without serious question.81
Classen J. Gramm, Jr.
72 The contrary position is expressed in Judge Hamley's dissent in Kaul v. City of Chehalis,
45 Wash. 2d 616, 277 P.2d 352, 365 (1954).
73 Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 196.125-196.145 (1949).
74 273 P.2d 859 (Okla. 1954).
75 269 Wis. 276, 69 N.W.2d 242 (1955).
76 E.g., De Aryan v. Butler, 119 Cal. App. 2d 674, 260 P.2d 98 (1953).
77 These effects are summarized in Readey at 352 S.W.2d 626.
78 E.g., Chapman v. City of Shreveport, 225 La. 859, 74 So. 2d 142 (1954); Kaul v. City
of Chehalis, 45 Wash. 2d 616, 277 P.2d 352 (1954).
79 Whether such toxic effects will show up is still a moot question though all the evidence
to date seems to indicate that fluoride is safe.
80 Waldbott, The Case Against Mass Fluoridation, The Detroit News, September 18, 1960,
p. 10, provides a good summary of the medical-scientific objections to fluoridation. Dr. Wald-
bott argues particularly that it is not uncommon to find people with an abnormal sensitivity to
fluorine and for these people especially, fluoridation can be highly dangerous.
It is noteworthy, however, that the American Medical Association in its 1957 Statement on
Fuoridation of Public Water Supplies concludes: No evidence has been found since the 1951
statement by the Councils to prove that continuous ingestion of water containing the equivalent
of approximately lppm of fluorine for long periods by large segments of the population is harm-
ful to the general health.
81 It is possible that if the situation ever arose where harmful effects could be traced to the
consumption of fluorine that recovery in tort against the fluoridating municipality would be the
vehicle for the breakthrough, rather than a suit on constitutional grounds. To date there appear
to be no cases on record of tort recovery against a municipality and RHYNE, FLUORIDATION OF
MUNICIPAL WATER SUPPLY- A REVIEw OF THE SCIENTIFIC AND LEGAL AsPECTS (1952) sug-
gests that the likelihood of there being a successful recovery is small. This may be explained not
only by the apparent safety of fluoridation but by the evidentiary problem of proving that an
injury resulted from drinking the municipality's water rather than from some other cause.
